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STRINGS ATTACHED - VIOLIN FRAUD AND
OTHER DECEPTIONS
Carla J. Shapreau *
VIOLIN FRAUD: DECEPTION, FORGERY, THEFT, AND THE LAW. By
Brian W. Harvey. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp.
viii, 126. $35.

The lure of the violin has stirred passion in the hearts and minds of
musicians and collectors of the violin family, 1 many of whom have
fallen victim to fraud and other misdeeds throughout history. The
subject of such misdeeds, from a legal standpoint, is the focus of a
provocative new book, Violin Fraud: Deception, Forgery, Theft, and
the Law, by Brian W. Harvey. 2 Harvey's book examines the microcosm of the violin world and incorporates a general overview of civil
and criminal English law as applied to, among other things, violin
theft and the intentional and negligent misattribution and description
of violins.
This book review includes three Parts: a general discussion of the
issues Harvey raises; an examination of the possible legal implications
of secret commissions paid to violin teachers by violin dealers or makers, which Harvey touches on briefly; and an analysis of how the discovery of allegedly false "opinions" as to the authenticity or
description of a violin may affect a consumer's remedies when discovery is not made within the applicable statute of limitations.

I. THE PLAYERS AND THE PRACTICES
Harvey sets the backdrop for his analysis by describing the gamut
of players involved in the violin trade, including the "suppliers" on the
one hand (violin dealers, violin makers, and auction houses) and those
creating demand for instruments (musicians, students, and collectors)
on the other. As Harvey observes, the violin involves both visual and
musical aesthetics (p. 2), which together make it a unique hybrid of
the worlds of art and music.
Woven throughout Violin Fraud are entertaining historical anec• Attorney, Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, Oakland, Cal., specializing in intellectual property and commercial law. B.A. 1983, Humboldt State University (magna cum Iaude); J.D. 1988,
University of California, Hastings. The author is also a professional violin maker and a member
of the American Federation of Violin and Bow Makers. - Ed.
1. The term violin as used in this review encompasses all members of the violin family, including the violin, viola, cello, and double bass.
2. Professor of Law, University of Birmingham.
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dotes. For example, in 1685 in Italy, a man petitioned the Duke of
Modena for assistance in a matter involving the false labeling of a
violin:
Your most Serene Highness,
Tomasso Antonio Vitali, your most humble petitioner, now at the service of Your Most Serene Highness, bought of Francesco Capilupi,
through the medium of the Rev. Ignazio Paltrinieri, a violin f~r the price
of twelve pistoles because this violin bore the label of Nicolo Amati, a
maker of great repute in his profession. Your petitioner has, however,
discovered that the said violin was falsely labelled, he having found underneath the label one of Francesco Ruggieri, called "II Pero,'' a maker
of much less repute, whose violins at the utmost do not realize more than
three pistoles. Your petitioner has consequently been deceived by the
false label, and he appeals to Your Most Serene Highness for the ap·
pointment of a legal representative, who, without many formalities and
judicial proceedings, and after ascertaining the petitioner's proofs of his
assertions, should quickly provide [relief].
That God may long preserve Your Most Serene Highness's precious
life ....

(Signed) TOMASSO A. VITALI. [pp. 10-11]

Harvey also provides a fairly detailed description of violin forgers'
practices, including artificial distressing of varnish, simulated wear
patterns, neck grafts for purported proof of conversion from baroque
to the more modern neck length, creation of strategic "repaired
cracks" with interior studs, and forged labels (pp. 68-73).
As with fine art, the value of a violin is greatly enhanced if the
instrument is attributed to a famous maker from a particular geographic location and time period. Although musicians and collectors
have traditionally sought out Italian violins from the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, with the inflation of the prices of such violins,
consumers are now discovering the merits of English, French, and
German violins from the classic and postclassic periods as well as the
virtues of modern violins made worldwide.
Although the practice of deception in the violin trade has continued unabated for centuries, there is a surprising dearth of reported
opinions in the United States and England relating to such misdeeds
(p. 15). With a virtual absence of caselaw involving the violin family
from which to draw, "art law" provides the most fertile analogy for
substantive law with respect to claims for misrepresentation, breach of
contract, breach of warranty, replevin, and conversion, as well as related claims, because of the near identity of factual and legal issues
that occur in transactions involving artwork and violins.
Harvey's book, although based on English law, discusses the same
basic substantive civil claims that are likely to arise under U.S. law in
cases of misattribution and misdescription, such as fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, breach of contract, and breach of express and implied warranties (pp. 20-39, 46-85). In both England and the Unit~d
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States, a court will generally not find negligence claims meritorious if
the seller uses the care, skill, and due diligence ordinarily used by reputable violin makers or dealers practicing in the same or a similar locality under similar circumstances. 3 For breach of contract and
warranty claims, the seller may successfully assert various defenses,
including mistake,4 fraud, failure of consideration, an appropriately
worded and conspicuous disclaimer,5 a limitation of remedies provision in a sales agreement involving a certification of authenticity or
value, and the statute of limitations. 6
English law diverges from U.S. law with respect to stolen goods
and acquisition of title. English law employs the rule of "market
overt" (pp. 95-98), which Harvey describes as a "quaint, awkward,
and far from creditable part of English law" (p. 99). The doctrine of
market overt allows a buyer to acquire good title to stolen goods if
they are purchased in good faith, without notice of any defect or want
of title on the part of the seller, and sold in a "market" that is "open,
public, and legally constituted by grant, prescription, or statute" (p.
96). In contrast, in the United States, a good-faith purchaser c;annot
generally acquire title to, or right to possession of, stolen property.7
However, the statute of limitations may bar an owner's right to
recover a stolen violin. Again, the law in England and the United
States differs. Harvey states that an owner's right to title in England is
extinguished and his right to claim damages is barred if discovery of
the theft and the whereabouts of the violin occurs more than six years
from the date a good-faith purchaser buys a violin (pp. 98-99).
In sharp contrast, in the United States two rules have evolved that
may toll the statute of limitations on an owner's cause of action
against a good-faith purchaser arising from the theft of artwork. 8 The
minority rule, known as the "demand rule," tolls the statute of limita3. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL [BAJI] 6.37 (7th ed. Supp. 1994) (regarding professional negligence).
4. See, e.g., Smith v. Zimbalist, 38 P.2d 170, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934) (holding a sale to be
unenforceable when there was a mutual mistake on the part of plaintiff collector and defendant
violinist as to the authenticity of purported Stradivarius and Guarnerius violins).
5. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1990).
6. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1990), which provides a four-year statute oflimitations, likely applies to
contract or breach of warranty claims involving the sale of a violin.
7. See U.C.C. § 2-403 (1990) (providing that "[a] purchaser of goods acquires all title which
his transferor had or had power to transfer") Clearly, a thief cannot transfer good title to anyone; nor can a person receiving stolen goods from a thief, or a person in line of possession of a
thief, obtain title to stolen goods. See, e.g., Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi, 492 A.2d 917, 922-23 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1985) (holding that "a possessor of stolen goods, no matter how innocently acquired,
can never convey good title") (quoting Schrier v. Home Indem. Co., 273 A.2d 248, 250 (D.C.
1971)); see also Suburban Motors, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 268 Cal. Rptr. 16,
19 (Ct. App. 1990).
8. The caselaw relating to stolen artwork provides the best analogy for cases of stolen violins
because of the similar nature of the article at issue. See Andrea E. Hayworth, Note, Stolen
Artwork: Deciding Ownership Is No Pretty Picture, 43 DUKE L.J. 337 (1993) (discussing both the
"demand rule" and the "discovery rule" as applied to stolen artwork); see also RALPH E. LER-
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tions until an aggrieved owner discovers the stolen item's whereabouts9 and makes a timely demand for return of the item and the
wrongful possessor refuses to return it. 10 The demand rule shifts the
primary burden of investigation to the good-faith purchaser and requires that she attempt to verify the provenance of artwork or a violin
prior to purchase. In contrast, the majority rule, known as the "discovery rule," tolls accrual of the owner's cause of action until the
owner knows, or reasonably should know, the identity of the possessor.11 Unlike the demand rule, the discovery rule shifts the primary
burden to the owner by requiring that the owner notify relevant authorities and conduct a diligent search for the stolen item.
Harvey provides the retailer, auctioneer, collector, or teacher with
practical guidelines for avoiding liability. For example, he suggests:
• Remove offending labels when appropriate;
• Use a prominent disclaimer in sales transactions in which a buyer may
be misled as to attribution or description of the violin;
• Use due diligence when preparing certifications of authenticity, appraisals, or other documents that describe the instrument and identify in
detail the instrument at issue;
• When advertising the sale of an instrument make it clear that you are
in the trade and not selling as a private person;
• Do not attempt to exclude implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability when defects are latent;
• Keep copies of all documents provided to customers that contain descriptions or attributions and keep records that will enable the violin
dealer or maker to reidentify the instrument in the future; and
NER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS,
AND ARTISTS 82-90 (Practising Law Institute No. Gl-1010, 1989).
9. In most cases, it will be difficult for a true owner to acquire actual or constructive notice of
the identity of the possessor of a stolen violin or piece of art because the item is usually kept in a
private collection or home. See, e.g., O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 871 (N.J. 1980) (finding
the private residential display of stolen art insufficient to afford notice to the true owner). But see
United States v. One Stradivarius Violin, 188 F. 542, 543-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (finding the statute
of limitations not tolled on a customs claim under a fraudulent concealment theory because the
well-known Stradivarius violin was "habitually played on by different artists at [defendant's]
Sunday afternoon musical parties" and on one occasion was played at a public concert), ajfd.,
197 F. 157 (2d Cir. 1912).
10. See, e.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991);
DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987) (developing modified demand rule to include requirement of due diligence on the part of the owner in searching for a stolen painting),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988); Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), ajfd., 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982); Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct.
1966), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967), modification revd., 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y.
1969).
11. See, e.g., O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 874; Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus
v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), ajfd., 917 F.2d 278
(7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 377 (1991); see also CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 338(c) (West
Supp. 1994) (providing that a "cause of action in the case of theft ..• of any article of ••• artistic
significance is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the whereabouts of the article by
the aggrieved party, his or her agent, or the law enforcement agency which originally investigated the theft").
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• If you are a teacher or a dealer, do not accept or pay secret commissions arising from sales to students. 12

Harvey's practical guidelines should be helpful to those involved in the
violin trade.

II.

THE HAzARDS OF SECRET COMMISSIONS AND THE DUTY
DISCLOSE

To

It is common practice in the United States, and apparently in England, for teachers to receive secret commissions "from particular dealers in whose direction the pupil has been deliberately pointed" (p.
118). Harvey suggests that this practice is an abuse of the teacher's
position of trust, may be a breach of the teacher's contract of employment, and may even be a crime in England (pp. 47, 118). In his practical guidelines section, he further states:
Secret profits like these are held by the fiduciary (i.e. the teacher) in trust
for the beneficiary (the pupil) and if the practice is discovered the teacher
will be required to account for the money. Traders, too, should eliminate the payment of this type of commission in the terms of any Code of
Practice. [p. 118]

The harm of secret commissions is felt not just by the student, who
may be paying for his teacher's commission through an inflated sales
price. In addition, violin makers and dealers who refuse to engage in
this industry custom may suffer competitive injury when teachers
choose to send their students elsewhere.
Generally, students place special confidence and trust in their violin teachers, and teachers have great power to influence decisions
made by their students, who typically rely on their teachers' expertise,
superior knowledge, and training. In certain circumstances, there may
be a special relationship of trust and confidence between teacher and
student that may arguably give rise to an elevated duty of care by the
teacher or even a fiduciary duty. 13 The special relationship that exists
between a student and her violin teacher may expose the teacher to
liability for accepting secret commissions when a conflict of interest
exists between the teacher's self-interest in obtaining commissions and
her duty to the student.
Although no reported case in the United States has addressed the
legality of secret commissions in this context, the practice of paying
and receiving secret commissions may run afoul of state statutes. For
example, California's Unfair Practices Act arguably prohibits secret
commissions under the appropriate factual scenario:
12. Harvey includes these and other suggestions in an appendix. Pp. 114-18.
13. See 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary 385 (1961) ("A fiduciary relationship may exist or come into
being whenever trust and confidence are reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of
another .•• or when there is a reposing of faith, confidence, and trust, and the placing of reliance
by one person on the judgment and advice of another."). Whether or not a fiduciary relationship
exists is a question of fact. Id. at 387.
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The secret payment or allowance of rebates, refunds, commissions, or
unearned discounts, whether in the form of money or otherwise, or
secretly extending to certain purchasers special services or privileges not
extended to all purchasers purchasing upon like terms and conditions, to
the injury of a competitor and where such payment or allowance tends to
destroy competition, is unlawful 14
In addition, concealing a commission may constitute actionable
fraudulent concealment under the common law if the teacher's special
or fiduciary relationship with the student gives rise to a duty to disclose.15 In the absence of a fiduciary relationship, a teacher may commit actionable fraudulent concealment when she makes some
representations relating to the sales transaction but suppresses the arguably material fact that she is receiving a commission from the
seller. 16
The payment of secret commissions by a violin dealer or maker to
a teacher also may be an antitrust violation under the Robinson-Patman Act, which provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or
any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in
connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise,
either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in
fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any
party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted or paid.1 7

In Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 18 a photographer paid commissions to schools in exchange for the schools' endorsement as the "official photographer." Both the photographer and
the schools disclosed to the students that an unspecified portion of the
14. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 17045 (West 1987) (emphasis added); see also United States
v. Di Girolamo, 808 F. Supp. 1445, 1450-52 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (finding that kickbacks paid to
obtain a competitive edge violated California's Unfair Practices Act).
15. See, e.g., Heliotis v. Schuman, 226 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[N]ondisclosure
or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not
known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff;
and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material
facts." (citing 4 BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 459-464 (8th ed.
1974))).
16. See, e.g., Zinn v. Ex-Cello-0 Corp., 306 P.2d 1017, 1025 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957)
("(W]here the defendant, who has no duty to speak, nevertheless does so •.. he is bound to speak
truthfully and to speak the whole truth."); see also Rogers v. Warden, 125 P.2d 7, 9 (Cal. 1942);
R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 551 cmt. g (1977).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1988). See, e.g., Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851
(9th Cir. 1965) (holding that a corporate defendant's commercial bribes to a state employee to
obtain competitive advantage violated § 13(c)), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
18. 713 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Va. 1989), affd., 903 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1990).
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photograph price would be given to each school to support various
school activities.
When a competitor challenged this practice, the district court
found that section 13(c) had not been violated. "Because secrecy is an
essential element of Section 13(c) commercial bribery, the contractual
arrangement at issue here is not illegal." 19 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling without addressing the secrecy issue.
Instead, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the schools did not act as
agents, representatives, or intermediaries on behalf of the students, as
those terms are used in section 13(c).2 0
Similarly, in Harris v. Duty Free Shoppers, 21 the court found no
antitrust violation when the operator of a duty-free store made secret
payments to tour companies and tour guides to promote its shop. The
court concluded that the tour operators and guides were not in an
agency or fiduciary relationship with their passengers and did not
serve as intermediaries subject to the passengers' direct or indirect
control as to the purchase of the store's goods. 22
The Ninth Circuit distinguished the facts in Harris from the
agency relationship in McCollum v. Friendly Hills Travel Center. 23 In
McCollum, the court held that a fiduciary relationship existed between
a tourist and his travel agent because the travel agent "had arranged
his trip and had vouched for the excellent condition of certain sporting
equipment," the defects of which later caused the plaintllrs injuries. 24
In contrast to the facts in Harris and Stephen Jay Photography, a
violin teacher, much like the agent in McCollum, may act as a special
agent for the student or as an intermediary for purposes of the
purchase transaction. The teacher may arrange for the specific transaction and vouch for the condition and attributes of the violin, thereby
arguably creating a relationship between the student and the teacher
worthy of protection by the antitrust laws.
Although section 13(c) does make an exception for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, the exception
will not apply when the teacher receives a commissi0n for services
rendered to the seller but against the best interest of the buyer. 25
19. 713 F. Supp. at 941.
20. Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 993 (4th Cir. 1990).
21. 940 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1991).
22. 940 F.2d at 1275.
23. 217 Cal. Rptr. 919 (Ct. App. 1985).
24. Harris, 940 F.2d at 1274-75 (citing McCol/um, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 923).
25. See, e.g., Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851, 859 (9th Cir. 1965)
(refusing to construe the "services rendered" exeeption to include services performed by a
buyer's agent for the seller but against the interest of the buyer, because such an interpretation
would undermine the fiduciary relationship between buyers and their agents), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 936 (1966); Modem Mktg. Serv., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commn., 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir.
1945) (finding that brokerage commissions could not be paid by sellers to the buyers' agent for
services that were incidental to the agent's main activities on behalf of the buyers, even though
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One way to avoid potential liability for violation of state unfair
trade practices statutes, for fraud, or for violation of the RobinsonPatman Act in connection with commissions is for teachers to be compensated openly for the valuable expert service that they can provide
to their students in the instrument-selection process by candidly accepting payment for such expert services. In the absence of such a
disclosure, violin teachers, dealers, and makers expose themselves to
possible liability if the requisite degree of trust and confidence is reposed in the teacher by the student with respect to circumstances surrounding the student's purchase of a violin.

III.

DISCOVERY OF FRAUD AND DECEPTION: FIDDLING AWAY
THE TIME AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Harvey states in his summary of practical guidelines that to avoid
or minimize potential liability "[c]ertificates etc. of authenticity should
normally do no more then express an opinion" (p. 115). Under American law, however, the courts will likely treat a representation cloaked
in "opinion" language to avoid liability for fraud, negligence, or
breach of warranty as an actionable misrepresentation of fact when
made by a violin dealer or maker who holds himself out to the public
as an expert and when the buyer reasonably relies on such superior
knowledge to her detriment. 26
Although Harvey does not discuss the details of litigating civil
claims for false certification or misdescription on a breach of contract
or warranty theory, one major issue may be whether or not the statute
of limitations bars such a claim. For example, if a violin dealer or
maker knowingly or negligently misrepresents the authenticity of a violin in connection with a sale by incorrectly stating that the violin was
made by Stradivarius, a buyer's claim may not reasonably be discovered until the owner decides to sell the violin, which may be twenty
years or more after the purchase. 27
The applicable statute of limitations and the buyer's duty to disthe services were genuine and of benefit to the sellers). In Modern Marketing, the Seventh Circuit noted that "[t]he agent cannot serve two masters simultaneously rendering services in an
arm's length transaction to both." 149 F.2d at 978 (quoting Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Commn., 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1939)).
Even when a seller renders a service for the benefit of the student-buyer, when the actual
services rendered are de minimis, the exception to § 13(c) will probably provide no refuge. Cf.
Hennegan v. Pacifico Creative Serv., Inc., 674 F. Supp. 303, 306 (D. Guam 1987) (holding that
§ 13(c) does not prohibit payments by store owners to tour bus drivers for services rendered in
bringing tourists to their stores because such services are not de minimis).
26. See, e.g., Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 79 Cal. Rptr. 369, 378 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)
("Where the party making the representations has superior knowledge regarding the subject matter of his representations, and the other party is so situated that he may reasonably rely on such
supposed superior knowledge or special information, the representations may be considered as
fact and not opinion." (citations omitted)); see also Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., 745
F. Supp. 1556, 1565 (D. Haw. 1990).
27. See, e.g., Rosen v. Spanierman, 894 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a breach of
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cover the seller's misrepresentation have been the subject of litigation
in the art world with interesting and disparate results. In cases involving works of art, the First,28 Second,29 and Third Circuits30 have foreclosed buyers from obtaining a remedy for breach of warranty claims
when they failed to discover the breach until after the running of the
applicable statute of limitations, which is generally four years from
tender of delivery under the Uniform Commercial Code.3 1 These circuits have held that the statute of limitations bars claims for breach of
warranty when the warranty does not explicitly extend to future performance and when discovery of an alleged defect in a work of art
does not necessarily await future performance. 32 This result may appear harsh when a buyer bas no obvious reason to obtain a second
opinion regarding attribution or description of a violin until be decides
to sell the violin - in many instances more than four years after
purchase and after the statute of limitations bas arguably barred his
breach of contract and warranty claims.
In sharp contrast to the First, Second, and Third Circuits, the trial
court in Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc. 33 found that the
buyer was effectively precluded by the price of the artwork - purported works by Salvador Dali that were purchased for a total of
$36,200 - as well as by the defendant's repeated assurances and
fraudulent concealment of the truth, from unde~king an extensive
investigation into the veracity of the seller's claims of authenticity until ten years after the purchase, when the buyer became aware of newspaper articles and television reports that indicated that the defendant's
representations might be false. 34
The Balog court held:
[I]n the case of art work which is certified authentic by an expert in the
warranty claim for the sale of a fake painting brought 20 years after purchase was barred by the
statute of limitations).
28. Wilson v. Hammer Holdings, Inc., 850 F.2d 3, 4-7 (1st Cir. 1988).
29. Rosen, 894 F.2d at 31.
30. Firestone & Parson, Inc. v. Union League, 833 F.2d. 304 (3d. Cir.}, affg. without opinion
672 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
31. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1990). However, § 2-725(2) provides an exception to the four-year
statute of limitations. If "a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and
discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues
when the breach is or should have been discovered." U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1990) (emphasis added}.
A sales agreement may also shorten the four-year statute of limitations to "not less than one
year." U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1990).
32. See Wilson, 850 F.2d at 4-7; Rosen 894 F.2d at 31-32; Firestone, 672 F. Supp. at 822; see
also Lawson v. London Arts Group, 708 F.2d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting in dicta that,
although the plaintiff did not reasonably suspect a breach of warranty claim until well after the
four-year statute of limitations set forth in U.C.C. § 2-725(2), "it would not have been impossible
for her to have discovered the breach earlier. Consequently, this discovery did not necessarily
have to await the [artwork's] future 'performance.' ").
33. 745 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Haw. 1990).
34. 745 F. Supp. at 1558-59, 1566.
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field or a merchant dealing in goods of that type, such a certification of
authenticity constitutes an explicit warranty offuture performance sufficient to toll the U. C. C. 's statute of limitations. 35

Applying the discovery rule, the Balog court further held that "the
limitations period of a claim of a party seeking damages for breach of
such warranty accrues at the time when the breach is discovered or
reasonably should have been discovered." 36
The type of claim pled by a purchaser of a violin or artwork may
be critical because the measure of damages recoverable for a fraud or
negligence claim - restoration to pretransaction status - may, depending on the jurisdiction,37 preclude the buyer from obtaining lost
profits or appreciation damages, 38 whereas a breach of contract or
warranty claim may provide the.buyer with compensation for the benefit of the agreement had it been fully performed. 39
The discovery rule will only apply to claims for breach of warranty
under U.C.C. § 2-725(2) if a warranty explicitly extends to the future
performance of the goods and if discovery of the breach must await
the time of such performance.40 As previously discussed, there is a
split in authority as to how section 2-725(2) should be applied to
claims involving artwork. The better view on the warranty-of-future
performance prong of section 2-725(2) is set forth in Balog because the
authenticity of a violin or artwork is not expected to change over time.
Therefore, if a seller warrants that a violin is an authentic Stradivarius,
35. 745 F. Supp. at 1570 (emphasis added). The court went on to note that artwork, as well
as antiques, are "the type of thing about which questions as to authenticity normally arise only at
some future time, usually the time of resale." 745 F. Supp. at 1570 n.22, 1571. "Since artwork
does not 'perform' in the traditional sense of goods covered by the U.C.C., and since the authen·
ticity of a work of art, i.e. its 'performance', would not change over time, [defendant's] warranty
necessarily guaranteed the present and future existence of the art as authentic works of Salvador
Dali." 745 F. Supp. at 1571.
36. Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1572.
37. If a buyer sues under a tort theory, he may not be able to recover lost profits or appreciation damages. The result will depend on whether the jurisdiction follows the "benefit-of-thebargain" rule, the "out-of-pocket-loss" rule, or some modification thereof. If the out-of-pocketloss rule is followed, the defrauded plaintiff generally recovers only the consideration paid. If the
benefit-of-the-bargain rule is followed, the plaintiff may be able to recover lost profits or appreciation damages. California has established a highly modified out-of-pocket-loss rule under Civil
Code § 3343 that authorizes recovery oflost profits as consequential damages. CAL. C1v. CODE
§ 3343 (West Supp. 1993). See, e.g., Hartman v. Shell Oil Co., 137 Cal. Rptr. 244, 248-49 (Ct.
App. 1977); see also Koerner v. Davis & Stein Galleries, Inc., No. 85 Civ. 0742 (S.D.N.Y. May
21, 1987) (awarding the plaintiff a benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages, which included
appreciation damages, for claims of conversion for failure to return a stolen painting after
demand).
38. Lost profits or appreciation damages may be an important component of a claim when a
buyer purchases a violin made by a purported famous maker, which, if genuine, would have
appreciated in value after purchase.
39. See, e.g., Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742, 745 (N.Y. 1969) (permitting a buyer to obtain
appreciation damages for a breach of warranty of title claim under the Uniform Sales Act in
connection with the sale of artwork).
40. u.c.c. § 2-725(2) (1990).
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this warranty should be deemed a warranty that extends to future performance of the goods under U.C.C. § 2-725(2). However, a purchaser of a violin remains at risk of failing to meet the second prong of
U.C.C. § 2-725(2) if the purchaser does not obtain a second opinion as
to the authenticity of the violin within four years of tender of delivery.
CONCLUSION
Violin Fraud is an interesting and enjoyable examination of the
culpability that may arise out of the false attribution and description
of violins, with a message targeted not only at consumers but also at
violin dealers, makers, auctioneers, and other sellers of the violin.
Harvey provides a valuable contribution in an area in which there is a
dearth of legal discussion, although some of the issues raised closely
mirror issues addressed in the field of art law. Violin Fraud provides
an excellent foundation for further legal inquiry into, and analysis of,
the gray areas implicated by the specialized area of violin commerce.

